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Abstract: 
During disturbing financial times, the economy suffers from the lack of provisioning that 
companies exhibit. Under IFRS 9, regulators intend to mitigate this issue. The following 
research project provides evidence regarding the interactions between the Economic Cycle, 
Loans and Provisions plus the adverse effect of the latter on regulatory capital. Moreover, using 
an empirical approach, it updates existing literature regarding the influence provisions have on 
the upward and downward movements of the business cycles. Overall, the new standard may 
contribute to the stability of the economy but is dependent on its consistent and rigorous 
application by banks. 
Keywords: Provisions; Financial Stability; Regulatory Capital; IFRS 9; Expected Credit 
Losses 
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(1) IAS and IFRS are the acronym for International Accounting Standard and International Financial Reporting Standard, respectively. IAS 
standards were introduced between 1973 and 2001, while IFRS standards have been substituting the IAS since 2001. 
Introduction 
After the 2008 financial crisis, the International Accounting Standards Board (2014) and the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board (2016) have agreed to come up with a new standard that 
has the purpose of resolving what has been considered as the major weakness of financial 
accounting standards: the late recognition of credit losses. The newly created standard – IFRS 
9 - focus on a more forward-looking methodology of accounting for financial instruments. 
However, much concern has been recently expressed about the effects of the new accounting 
standards implemented in 2018. The change for financial institutions on moving from the IAS 
39 to IFRS 9 (1), provides challenges both for themselves and for their stakeholders. Specifically, 
due to the new impairment model, instead of recognizing expected loan losses when they occur, 
entities will now have to forecast them, distributing provisions between periods of expansion 
and recessions (thus, steadier state levels) and having an impact on their capital requirements. 
Central banks, banking regulators, auditing and consulting firms are engaged on evaluating the 
impact, as the change can alter the economic cycle, lead to a misallocation of lending resources 
and possibly altering financial stability. 
The main hypothesis to be tested in this paper is: The new accounting framework, IFRS 9, will 
contribute to the financial stability of the economy. Consequently, this research studies the new 
impairment model, providing evidence on the input that provisions and therefore, the new 
accounting basis, brings to the economy. This paper is structured as follows: Section 1 
familiarizes the new impairment model and covers the literature review on the adoption and 
expected impact of IFRS 9. Section 2 details the methodology used over this paper and 
addresses the research questions, while section 3, 4 and 5 presents and examines the main 
results. Lastly, section 6 outlines the main outcomes, concluding remarks, limitations and 
suggestions for further research.
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1. Literature Review 
IFRS 9 is a new international financial reporting standard that has the mission of substituting 
IAS 39 and addresses the accounting of financial assets. The objective is to overcome some of 
the problems appointed to IAS 39, namely the late recognition of losses on lending and it 
divides into three major topics: 1. Classification and measurement of financial instruments; 2. 
Impairment (Expected Credit Losses (ECL) Model) and 3. Hedging. 
Focusing on the second point for the development of this thesis and on held to maturity 
instruments, namely loans, when banks provide them to numerous people or entities, they are 
at the same time exposed to the borrower’s risk, that is, to the possibility of those entering in 
default. In those situations, and when the collateral is lower than the loan carrying amount, 
banks will face direct credit losses. With the new impairment model, banks are now required to 
set aside an amount (referred to as loss provisions) to cover for any expected losses on their 
lending. In terms of reporting adjustments to this account of loss provisions, an increase or 
decrease of the same is going to be reflected on the company’s income statement, recorded as 
a loss or gain, respectively. Now, the recognition of these provisions will occur with much more 
frequency as the new impairment model is grounded on the long-term, i.e. on a forward looking 
perspective, whereas IAS 39 only recognized incurred credit events, resulting in a backward-
looking framework. Before, credit losses were only recognized if there was a clear sign of a 
credit event, being default situations or a delay to comply with loans obligations, prime 
examples of a credit event. Hence, the new impairment model is not expected to increase the 
amount of credit losses documented in a downturn. Rather, it will change how those same losses 
are distributed over time, recognizing a bigger portion of those in the beginning of a downturn, 
where expectations of defaults are starting to rise.
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(2) Expected Credit Losses (ECL) = Probability of Default (PD) * Loss Given Default (LGD) * Exposure at Default (EAD) 
IFRS 9 divides the new impairment model into three layers, contingent on changes in credit 
risk since the beginning of the instrument’s life. In other words, banks should move their loans 
expected losses between stages if there is an increase or decrease in the expectation of those 
(Table 1). Therefore, interest 
revenue and expected credit 
losses (2) accounted in bank’s 
financial statements will vary as a 
function of the credit risk stage that financial assets are currently integrated in. Frykström, N. 
and Li, J. (2018) and Serrano, A.S. (2018), state that “a significant “cliff effect” in the 
provisions recognized could occur in those cases where the financial instruments (with maturity 
higher than one year) moves from 
stage 1 to stage 2, following a 
significant increase in credit 
risk”. On the other hand, between 
the transition from stage 2 to 
stage 3, this “cliff effect” is 
reduced when compared to IAS 39, under which is triggered by a default event (Figure 1). 
Although the implementation of the new IFRS 9 is expected resolve the before mentioned 
concerns, it still has some challenges needed to be overcome. According to Leman, E (2015) it 
still is considered an open book since a lot of its components are assigned to the 
entities/regulators/accountant’s consideration (e.g. what a decrease in credit quality is). Also, 
since the expected loss model includes too much managerial discretion, the accounting of 
provisions may vary along different stakeholders. For example, with regards to timing, the 
moment when the transition between stages is triggered is subject to the judgment of the 
representatives and to their interpretation of the loan riskiness.
Table 1: Overview of the Impairment Model 
Figure 1: IFRS 9 vs IAS 39 
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Focusing on the effect that IFRS 9 can have on the financial stability of the economy, Laeven, 
L., Majnoni, G. (2003), Beatty, A. and Liao, S. (2011), and Bushman, R.M. and Williams, C.D. 
(2015) showed that by delaying the acknowledgment of expected credit losses, a negative 
response on financial stability will follow. The logic behind starts with macroeconomic 
variables, like unemployment, inflation or interest rates, that ultimately determine credit losses. 
When those start to deteriorate, payments are going to become due.  However, between the first 
evidence of an economic downturn and the effective default, those delays in payments could be 
used by banks to anticipate the amount of credit losses, “enhancing their loss-absorbing capacity 
in downturns and ensuring a smooth provision of credit to the real economy afterwards” 
(Serrano, A.S. (2018)). Nevertheless, and quoting Novotny-Farkas, Z. (2016), “from a financial 
stability perspective, the concern is whether loan loss accounting amplifies the upward and 
downward swings of the business cycle”.  
Additionally, Deloitte (2016) and Novotny-Farkas, Z. (2016) presented in their reports evidence 
regarding some of the consequences of IFRS 9. They consider that the measurement of loan 
loss provisions is strictly connected to capital requirements and will eventually have an impact 
in the economy as a whole, especially since banks are a key stakeholder for the economy (for 
example, the capital requirements will most likely affect the lending criteria, which can impact 
the sustainability and recovery of the economy). Also, the expected increase in provisions with 
the introduction of the new IFRS 9 will decrease retained earnings. As it is an important 
component of Common Equity Tier 1 (CET1) resources (Exhibit 1), the most loss-absorbent 
type of capital and that to which investors and regulators take most consideration, additional 
impairment will have an influence on capital resources.  
Endorsing, Frykstrom, N. and Li, J. (2018) have estimated an increase between 13 and 25 per 
cent of provisions and a strong effect on banks’ capital requirements: “The total transitional 
effect of IFRS 9 on capital ratios is, mainly driven by the ECL requirements through increased 
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provisions and the estimated transitional impact on CET1 ratio is a decrease around 45-50 bps” 
(Exhibit 2).  Moreover, Beatty, A. and Liao, S. (2011), using a sample of U.S. banks, concluded 
that those that delay provisioning, will eventually reduce the amount of capital lent to the 
economy in comparison with banks that have smaller delays, due to insufficient capital 
resources and the subsequent difficulty to supplement capital in an economic downturn. 
In other words, IFRS 9 is considered to have less pro-cyclicality when compared to IAS 39, 
particularly regarding to provisioning. According to Financial Stability Forum (FSF 2009), pro-
cyclicality is considered as “the mutually reinforcing interactions through which the financial 
system can amplify business fluctuations and possibly cause or exacerbate financial instability”. 
Under the ECL approach, which indicates future macroeconomic conditions, the model 
specifies that credit losses should be accounted when the first indicators of economic distress 
begins to surface. This allows banks to recognise credit losses in an early stage which in turn 
are the periods where earnings are likely higher. Therefore, they will be able to prepare 
themselves to shoulder future losses (through the increase in capital reserves, given the level of 
provisions). That said, the new impairment model may contribute to the reduction of the 
downturns and upturns swings of the business cycle, thus enhancing economic stability (Exhibit 
3). In periods where the economy is growing, the likelihood of a bank to recognise a provision 
under IAS 39 is almost zero. Thus, they will be overstating earnings and capital requirements 
over this period, allowing banks to increase their lending rate. On the other hand, in recessions, 
some unprovisioned loans will materialise and shrink CET1, followed by a decrease of the 
company’s profits. Furthermore, the cut in capital requirements and the risk associated to the 
current economic conditions will lead banks to either reduce loan growth or to raise new capital 
to comply with the capital standards applied. Nevertheless, due to financing frictions, it might 
be difficult for entities to issue equity. Having no other alternative, banks will decrease lending, 
which may result on a credit crunch. Overall, the new ECL model is expected to diminish some 
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of the features of IAS 39 that intensified pro-cyclicality as the “the recognition of 12-month 
ECL in Stage 1 in a sense serves as an adjustment to the credit spread that is recognised through 
the yield, and thus, results in less overstated profits” - Novotny-Farkas, Z. (2016).  
Therefore, it is considered that the earlier accounting of expected losses and consequential 
provisions would smooth the up and downward movements of the business cycle. When using 
backward-looking, through economic expansions, there are fewer credit losses recognised, 
resulting in subordinate loss reserves. Alternatively, in recessions, loan loss provisions rise 
since defaults tend to increase over these stages. “As a result, the non-discretionary component 
is a driving force in the cyclicality of loan provisions and leads to a misevaluation” (Bouvatier, 
V. and Lepetit, L. (2006)). In addition, Keeton, W.R. (1999) and Jiménez, G. and Saurina, J. 
(2005) demonstrate that, typically, an increase of the lending rate in a thriving economic cycle 
is followed by an increase of credit impairments in slowdowns.  
Nevertheless, according to Greenawalt, M.B. and Sinkey Jr., J.F. (1988) the income-smoothing 
hypothesis could mitigate provisioning effects. Management may seek to reduce the variability 
of their profits through accounting decisions. For example, banks may shift particular revenue 
or expenses to obtain yearly earnings with lower volatility. Therefore, the impact on financial 
stability by the IFRS 9 could be diminished. However, in his study, Scheiner, J. (1981) obtained 
results of smoothing behavior in only 21,5% of the sample used (107 large banks during 1969 
to 1976). Thus, it was possible to conclude that "in general, banks do not appear to use the loan-
loss provision as a device to smooth income".   
2. Methodology 
This research aims to infer how and to what extent can IFRS 9 back economic stability. Over 
this section, a description of the analysis conducted is described based on the research questions 
implemented as well as the samples and data used. The quantitative and qualitative analysis 
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will focus on the level of provisions, which is considered to be the main variable associated 
with IFRS 9, and the impact it may have on financial stability.  
In alignment with this project hypothesis, five research questions (RQ) were established: 
RQ1: Do provisions tend to increase during economic expansions and decrease in downturns? 
RQ2: Do provisions contribute to the decrease of capital requirements? 
RQ3: Do loans granted by banks reduce after a decrease in CET1 ratio? 
RQ4: Can provisions contribute to the financial stability of the economy? 
RQ5: Will IFRS 9 ultimately have the same impact as provisions? 
For the first research question, a simple quantitative analysis was used to conclude about the 
relationships between GDP, Provisions and Loans and how those are influenced. The data 
collected was obtained from 2 different sources: ECB and Pordata for European Union from 
2007 to 2017.  
Secondly, regarding research question 2 and 3, a sample of 10 major banks in the E.U. was used 
to obtain Tier 1 Capital and Retained Earnings (the two as a % of Assets) gathered from 
companies’ annual reports. Empirical data from literature was also gathered regarding the effect 
that capital requirements have on credit supply.  These three research questions represent the 
deductive study of this paper and establishes the link between the increases in Provisions with 
pro-cyclicality. As discussed in the literature review, provisioning is influenced by the current 
and expected economic conditions, and its effects start on regulatory capital, moving on to the 
lending criteria before ending on the stability of the economy through pro-cyclicality. 
Thirdly, for research question number 4 and to analyze the statistical influence that provisions 
have on economic financial stability, two types of regressions were performed: Panel data and 
Time-series. For the first one, the initial sample of the regression intended to include all the 28 
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countries of European Union plus United States for the period of 2008 to 2017. However, due 
to the lack of information available for some of these countries, the final sample ended up 
including only 23 European Union countries. Moreover, two time-series were also performed. 
One will feature E.U. and the other U.K.  Both will represent a larger period of time, 1998-
2017, bringing a different perspective into the analysis. However, since the total provisions of 
each country/region was only available from the beginning of 2007, a sample of the provisions 
from the 5 biggest banks in each region was gathered.  For this research question the databases 
used were Pordata, ECB, World Bank, United Nations and OECD. 
Lastly, and based on the answers to the previous research questions the results will be 
extrapolated to estimate the impact that IFRS 9 new impairment model has on the economy. 
3. Deductive Study 
3.1 Relationship between Provisions, Loan and GDP Growth (RQ1) 
For the purpose of this paper it is important to better understand bank’s response to economic 
fluctuations and the relationship between Provisions and some macroeconomic conditions. 
Therefore, data was gathered through 2 different sources: World Bank and European Central 
Bank regarding European Union 
 By analyzing figure 2, it is evident that 
Loan growth follows the same path in 
most years as GDP growth (correlation is 
equal to 0,52), except for the year of 2016 
in which Loan growth has increased 
whereas GDP growth followed the 
opposite direction, compared to the 
previous year – the first has increased 0,7 percentage points whereas the second has decreased 
Figure 2: Provisions, Loans Issued and GDP Evolution in E.U. 
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4,7 p.p. These results were the ones expected with both supply and demand as driving forces 
(during expansions, the lending rate plus the demand for loans is higher due to market 
confidence and opportunities). Indeed, the years where Loans had the biggest decrease were 
2009, 2012 and 2013 (-1,77% ; -2,55% and -5,68%, respectively), periods where the 
macroeconomic conditions were struggling in the European Union, with Portugal and Greece 
as examples. 
The relationship between Provisions and GDP growth, even though not obvious, looks like a 
negative one: when there is a reduction in the economy growth, usually the level of provisions 
tend to increase. Indeed, if a regression is performed with Provisions Growth as the dependent 
variable and GDP growth as independent one (Table 2), when GDP growth decreases by one 
percentage point, provisions increase 
by 10 percentage points, on average, 
ceteris paribus (correlation is -0,69). 
Truly, if there is an increase in the 
impaired loans due to economic 
instability (in other words, smaller or 
even negative growth rates of GDP) by accounting laws, banks needed to put aside provisions 
to cover for those impaired losses (IAS 39). Supporting, the most evidence scenarios of this 
concept occurred in the years of 2008, 2009, 2012 and 2013 which were the years where GDP 
growth was either negative or close to 0% and Provisions reached it biggest increase and highest 
historical values. Indeed, when Provisions registered the highest growth from 2007 to 2008 
(261%), it was when GDP growth was almost zero - only 0,58%. These were the times where 
there were higher economy frictions, and consequently, a higher rate of defaults. 
Lastly, the relationship between Provisions and Loan growth follows the same reasoning as 
GDP growth, i.e. there is a negative correlation between the two (-0,84), specifically in the 
Table 2: Provisions Growth and GDP Growth Regression 
SUMMARY OUTPUT
Regression Statistics
Multiple R 0,24
R Square 0,06
Adjusted R Square -0,06
Standard Error 0,85
Observations 10
ANOVA
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0,37 0,37 0,50 0,50
Residual 8 5,85 0,73
Total 9 6,22
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 95,0% Upper 95,0%
Intercept 0,43 0,36 1,20 0,26 -0,40 1,27 -0,40 1,27
Provisions Growth -10,04 14,17 -0,71 0,50 -42,71 22,63 -42,71 22,63
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period of 2007 to 2015. Therefore, we can infer that backward-looking provisioning amplifies 
the cyclicality of bank lending. 
3.2 Impact of Provisions on Capital Requirements and Lending (RQ2 & RQ3) 
Regardless of the accounting standards used, when there is a change in the level of provisions, 
it will affect banks income statement, their returns on equity and most likely their capital 
requirements. This happens because Provisions are considered as an expense and, hence are 
deductions from net interest income (a direct consequence of increasing provisions). When the 
level of dividends is fixed, a provisions increase will result in a decrease of retained earnings 
and, following the same reasoning, a decrease on banks regulatory capital (via its impact on 
Tier 1).  
From a regulatory point of view, it is difficult to say whether an increase in provisions is 
desirable or not. By raising the level of provisions during economic expansions, the level of 
reserves applicable to absorb future expected losses might increase, while at the same time, 
depreciating the regulatory requirements buffers that entities have to mitigate other unexpected 
losses (e.g. sales reduction) (Exhibit 1). Nevertheless, it is also expected that if banks allocate 
these provisions during good times, they are limiting their capacity over this period, but in the 
long-run and in the possibility of a downturn, they are better prepared as the strike in capital 
requirements might not be so high due to the higher provision levels.  
Even though the net effect of the offsetting rules is difficult to estimate, by observing historical 
evidence, one can get an idea of the extent to which provisioning can influence capital. It is 
important to highlight that we are considering that provisioning will only directly distress 
capital to the extent that it affects retained earnings. Figure 3 shows the retained earnings and 
tier 1 capital as a percentage of assets of Europe 10 major banks in 2018 (by total assets) from 
the period of 2007 to 2017.  
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Figure 3: Tier 1 Capital, Retained Earnings and Provisions (% Assets) Evolution of Europe 10 major Banks 
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By observing Figure 3, it is possible to verify that there is a clear relationship between Tier 1 
Capital and Retained Earnings over this period as expected (CET1 is composed mainly by 
common stock and Retained Earnings). So, if provisions have a direct and adverse impact on 
company’s profit, it will decrease banks’ capital requirements as expected.  
Regarding the subsequent effects of capital requirements, when banks increase provisions they 
are reducing retained earnings. At the same time, an increase in provisioning is associated to 
riskier and fragile economic conditions (as discussed before in section 3.1), meaning that their 
risk weighted assets will increase. Consequently, when loan loss allowances increase, Core Tier 
1 Capital ratio (
𝐶𝐸𝑇1
𝑅𝑊𝐴
) will reduce significantly (through the decrease of CET1 and the increase 
of RWA). Considering that Basel III requires banks to have at least 4,5% of core capital to total 
risk weighted assets (Exhibit 1), one of the few possible solutions is to cut lending supply. 
Doing so, banks will be reducing the risk associated to their total assets and CET1 decreases 
considerably less. Thus, capital ratios increase and comply with the capital requirements under 
Basel III. However, in recessions, this event results in shortage of credit supply and negatively 
impacts the economy, contributing, furthermore, to its depression. Additionally, according to 
most empirical evidence, it is possible to corroborate that in general, an increase in capital 
requirements will reduce total credit supply in the short-run between 1,2 and 4,6 percentage 
points, on average, ceteris paribus (Table 3) 
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Overall, with the new impairment model, although the impact of one percentage point increase 
of capital requirements on credit supply is expected to maintain the same, by spreading 
provisions between up and downturns, capital ratios volatility (in absolute terms) will be 
significantly reduced. Following the same rational, credit supply will also suffer less variations. 
In conclusion, one can infer that the basis for the decrease of pro-cyclicality under IFRS 9 is 
established. According to section 3.1, banks usually react to economic struggles by increasing 
the level of provisions and, afterwards, reducing loans issuance. Moreover, as seen in section 
3.2, provisioning will result in a decrease of bank’s capital requirements. Consequently, by 
spreading provisions over time and not only in impairment events, banks are strengthening their 
capital buffers for the future and their lending criteria will suffer lower reductions in worst 
economic periods. As capital supply is a key influencer on the amplification of the upwards and 
downwards swings of the economy, the level of provisions may contribute to the reduction of 
pro-cyclicality. 
4. Econometric Study - Models and Data (RQ4) 
Moving on to the most quantitative examination of this paper, the intent of the upcoming 
analysis is to confirm empirically whether the adoption of IFRS 9 can contribute to the 
reduction of pro-cyclicality, achieved through Provisions. Thus, further on, we will develop an 
econometric model (in this case a regression analysis). At first, the objective was to perform a 
time-series with a range of 30 years for the European Union, where the regressand is a variable 
that represents economic stability. For the independent ones, as the objective of study is the 
possible contribution of provisions, those are going to be included, plus other macroeconomic 
variables to control the true effect of loan loss allowances.  
However, when accessing the various databases discussed in section 2, it was clear that 
gathering the data for 30 years for the European Union was unreasonable (data about provisions 
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Figure 4: Dependent Variable 
was only available since 2007). To face this challenge, two solutions arise: First, in order to 
overcome the small sample, a panel data was considered such that the amount of data available 
to perform the regression was wider and this way, increasing the robustness of the results. The 
data considers 23 countries across Europe over 10 periods (2008-2017). Secondly, the original 
idealized time-series will be performed, but in this case, only for the U.K. and the European 
Union where a sample of the 5 biggest banks is going to be considered to retrieve the data about 
provisions for the period of 1998-2017. 
The identification of the variables used in the model will be presented with due justification: 
Dependent Variable: 
Absolute value of GDP – GDP Trend: the variable reflects what is expected to be affected by 
the adoption of IFRS 9 – economic stability. By using this variable, we are obtaining the 
differences between the real GDP and the expected one based on previous years (using the trend 
function in excel). Doing so, we will be able to conclude on whether or not a variable can 
contribute to the reduction of the downturns and upturns swings of the business cycle and, thus, 
increasing the stability of the economy. The variable is in million euros (€) and the absolute 
value was used, since the objective is to conclude on the deviation of GDP from its trend, 
whether it is a positive or negative difference. Figure 4 pretends to better explain the variable 
in question, where the blue line represents the real GDP and the 
black one, the trend.  
Explanatory variables in study 
 Provisions: the relevant variable for the analysis of this paper represents the amount of 
provisions in the banking industry by country. This variable will help us understand the 
contribution of IFRS 9 to financial stability. The variable is in million euros (€) and we 
hypothesize a negative coefficient, since the expectation is that provisions will decrease the 
differences between GDP and its trend; 
     P a g e  16 | 35 
Control variables 
 Final Consumption: retrieved from World Bank, it is the total consumption made by private 
households plus the exchange of capital for goods and services. The currency used is in the 
current US dollar value ($), measured in millions, and we are expecting that higher 
consumption reduces financial instability, especially due to the potential of mitigating the 
downward movements of the economy through a fastest recovery, 
offsetting the GDP increase in expansions (Keynesian Model); 
 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI): this variable was retrieved from World Bank and consists 
on an investment made by a company or individual in a different country than the one it is 
originally based in. The currency used is in million in the current US dollar value ($) and we 
are expecting that if FDI has an impact on financial stability, it will be a positive one; 
 Net Exports: another World Bank data, which was calculated by making the difference 
between a country’s exports and imports. Once again, we are expecting a negative 
relationship, i.e., a higher financial stability (using the same logic as Final Consumption and 
FDI), and it is measured in the current US dollar value ($) in millions; 
 Inflation and Inflation2: a World Bank indicator, represented in percentage that reflects the 
rate at which the prices for goods and services rise. This variable was also squared, since it 
was expected that it follows a polynomial function, where until a certain level, the higher 
the inflation, the higher is the expected financial stability of the economy but only until a 
certain point. For example, having a 1% of inflation is a good sign of financial stability but 
a -1% or a 3% will likely increase the volatility; 
 Unemployment: once again, a World Bank indicator that represents the total unemployed 
individuals divided in percentage of the labor force available. Evidently, we are expecting a 
negative correlation between unemployment and the measured variable; 
Figure 5: Net Effect 
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 Population Density: the data regarding this variable was retrieved in the World Bank website 
where it represents the number of people per square kilometer. The hopes of this variable is 
that higher values represent lower fluctuations in the economy, since it is more challenging 
for an economy to oscillate when the population is bigger (the macro conditions would have 
to be worse than those countries with less population); 
 Education Index: a United Nations Indicator that measures the population education level by 
using average years of schooling as well as expected years of schooling. It ranges from 0 to 
1. Consequently, the higher the index, the stable is the economy expected to be; 
 Political Stability: a World Governance Indicators regarding the level of political stability, 
lack of violence or terrorism, among others. To do so, it measures the perception of the 
probability of political instability or the occurrence of violence/terrorism moved by political 
causes. The index ranges from -2,5, which indicates higher likelihood of instability, to 2,5, 
indicating a strong performance with lower political risk. Thus, it is expected that the 
economy is stable in nations with a higher political stability.  
 Public Debt and Public Debt2: data retrieved in the OECD database, denotes the amount of 
outstanding debt a country has issued over the years and is measured as a percentage of the 
GDP. This variable was also squared due to the trade-off theory, i.e., until a certain optimal 
point, debt is favorable as it is cheaper. But since that point, due to the distress costs 
associated, a higher amount of debt brings companies/countries to an instable situation. This 
theory was, therefore, added to the regression, by assuming that there is an interval of this 
variable, where a higher Public Debt converts into higher financial stability. Nevertheless, it 
is important to highlight that the preliminary results of the panel data regression showed that 
this relationship does not apply (both coefficients had the same sign). Consequently, for the 
time-series regressions we included both variables, whereas for panel data regression only 
the standard public debt was included. 
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To study the aforementioned relations, we computed the following regression on Stata: 
|𝐺𝐷𝑃 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑| = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑣𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 + 𝛽2𝐹𝐷𝐼 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
2 + 𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 +
𝛽6𝑃𝑜𝑝. 𝐷𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑦 + 𝛽7𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑚𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽8𝑁𝑒𝑡𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 + 𝛽9𝐸𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 + 𝛽11𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 +
 𝛽12𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡
2 + 𝑖. 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 +  𝑖. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 +  𝜀𝑖 
4.1 Model Results 
First of all, prior to proceeding with the analysis of the regressions it is important to clarify 
whether they have indications of autocorrelation (when there is a correlation between the 
dependent variable and its lagged form, over different time periods) and/or evidence of 
heteroscedasticity (when the variable standard deviation is not constant over time) between the 
variables, and possibly correct for it.  
Starting with autocorrelation, in the panel data regression, the Wooldridge test was performed 
in Stata to measure autocorrelation in Panel Data (Exhibit 6). When analyzing the results, one 
concludes that the null hypothesis is rejected for a 5% significance value (p-value is 0,025), 
meaning that there is evidence of auto-correlation in this regression. On the other hand, to 
analyze autocorrelation in the time-series regression, the simple Durbin Watson test was used. 
For the U.K. a DW value of 2,095 was obtained whereas for E.U. it is 2,54 (Exhibit 8 and 10). 
By observing the Durbin Watson table, and considering that there are 12 regressors excluding 
the intercept and 20 observations, the lower and upper limit (dL and dU) are respectively 0,2 
and 3,234 for a 5% significance value. Since both test results are allocated inside the interval 
of the lower and upper values, the test is inconclusive. 
Secondly, for the existence of heteroscedasticity, Breusch Pagan test in Stata was performed 
where the null hypothesis is H0: Constant Variance. Regarding Panel Data (Exhibit 6), we obtain 
a p-value of 0. Consequently, for any significance value, the null hypothesis is rejected, and 
there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in this regression. However, for both time-series, the p-
value of the Breusch Pagan test for the U.K. and E.U. is 0,97 and 0,81 respectively (Exhibit 7 
     P a g e  19 | 35 
Table 5: Panel Data Regression using Robust Standard Errors Table 6: U.K. Time-Series Regression 
and 9). That said, for the time-series regressions and for any confidence level, we do not reject 
the null hypothesis of constant variance and there is compliance with the homoscedasticity 
assumption. In Wooldridge, J. M. (2002), he presents a way of correcting for both 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation using a simple method – clustering. Cluster is a technique 
used, which consists on partition the data in clusters and then perform an individual multiple 
regressions within each cluster. If done correctly, the different clusters will exhibit minimal 
correlation from one another. This technique was applied to the panel data regression using the 
correspondent command in Stata – Cluster (country). However, by observing the preliminary 
results (Table 4), it was observed that by using this technique, only provisions would be 
significant at a 90% confidence 
level, although the 𝑅2 is 
considerably high (75%). That said, 
and since the goal of this research is 
to focus on the sign of the 
coefficients and the contribution of 
the IFRS 9 to financial stability and its components, the standard errors are not the main 
motivation in this study. Nevertheless, robust standard errors will be used for panel data, and 
automatically be correcting for heteroscedasticity. Now that we have described the variables 
and address violations of assumptions in Multiple Linear Regressions, we will proceed to the 
analysis using the tables below.    
Table 4: Panel Data Regression using Cluster 
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(3) The adjusted R2 was calculated based on the formula: 1 − (1 − 0,75) ∗ (230 − 1)/(230 − 11 − 1) 
 
Table 7: E.U. Time-Series Regression 
Starting with the overall 
significance of the models, the 
null hypothesis assuming all 
coefficients being equal to zero 
(hence, no model) is rejected 
for the 3 different regressions 
with a 10% significance value, with the smallest F-test being the time-series regression for the 
E.U - F(12;7) = 2,92 - while the panel data regression has the biggest one - F(42;187) = 13,83. 
Thus, we can state that all the models pass the overall significance test for a 10% confidence 
level. 
Moving on to the overall fit of the models and significance level of the variables, although in 
the three regressions the variables used are the same, the time range and type of regression is 
different from the panel data regression to the time-series one. Therefore, the adjusted  𝑅2 (and 
not the normal  𝑅2) must be used to compare them and infer which the best one is, as the normal 
 𝑅2 assumes that all predictors have an impact on the deviation in the regressand, which may 
not be the case. The regression which has the higher adjusted  𝑅2 is the panel data (74%), 
meaning that the independent variables justifies 74% of the variation in the dependent one (3). 
Following, is the U.K. time-series regression with an adjusted  𝑅2 of 69% and then, E.U. with 
55%. These results are encouraged since we are obtaining for the 3 different regressions, a big 
percentage in the adjusted 𝑅2. Nevertheless, the panel data is considered as the best regression 
to obtain the most reliable conclusions. Proceeding with the analysis, regarding the 
interpretation of the coefficients and their correspondent significance, we will perform the 
evaluation regression by regression.  
Focusing on the one we consider as the best one – Panel Data – some variables are not 
significant at the 5% two-tailed significance value, namely FDI, Inflation, Inflation2, 
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(4) The adjusted R2 was calculated based on the formula: 1 − (1 − 0,748) ∗ (230 − 1)/(230 − 7 − 1) 
Population Density, Consumption, Net Exports, Education Index and Political Stability 
(correspondent p-value is higher than 10%). In other words, there is not enough evidence to 
provide a conclusion with relative confidence for these specific variables. As for the significant 
ones – Provisions, Unemployment and Public Debt– the null hypothesis is rejected as their t-
stat is, respectively, -2,21, 3,06 and -2,3. In other words, since there are 229 degrees of freedom 
(230 observations – 1), using the t-student table, it is possible to confirm that the absolute t-stat 
of the significant variables are higher than 2.575 with a two-tailed alpha of 1%. On the other 
hand, it is also important to add that if robust standard errors were not used, all those 3 variables 
plus Final Consumption would be significant at the 1% significance level (Exhibit 5).  
Since we have a high number of variables (11) but only a few are significant, some variables 
were retrieved one by one (those with the highest p-values) in order to obtain a more simplified 
model where the adjusted  𝑅2 did not decrease (74%) (4). By analyzing Table 8, not only 
Provisions, Unemployment and 
Public Debt (% of GDP) are 
significant, but also Inflation, 
Population Density and Final 
Consumption at an 85% 
confidence level. Analyzing the 
coefficients one by one of this new regression, we have that: (1) If Provisions increase by one 
million €, the difference between the real GDP and its trend will decrease in 1,9€ million, on 
average, ceteris paribus; (2) Financial Instability increases by 213 340€ million for an 
additional one percentage point of Inflation. But for each additional percentage point of 
Inflation, the slope is reduced by 466 021,9€ million, on average, c.p; (3) if Unemployment 
increases by 1 percentage point, Financial Instability will increase 711 902,2€ million, on 
average, c.p; (4) if Population Density increases 1 unit, Financial Instability decreases 229,78€ 
Table 8: Simplified Panel Data Regression using Robust Standard Errors 
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million, on average, c.p; (5) if Final Consumption expenditure increases by one million $, the 
difference between the real GDP and its trend decreases by 0,24€ million, on average, c.p; (6) 
if Public Debt as a percentage of GDP increases by one percentage point, the financial 
instability decreases by 116 318,9€ million, on average, c.p. 
Regarding the other two regressions, since those were not considered as the best models and to 
avoid being too exhaustive on the variables examination, only the explanatory variable results 
will be discussed. In the U.K. time-series regression (Table 6), Provisions were not considered 
as a significant variable as the p-value is equal to 0,64. Therefore, and although we don’t reject 
the null hypothesis, if we were to provide with a conclusion about the effect of this variable, 
we would infer that for every one million euro increase of Provisions (in those 5 banks sample), 
Financial Instability would reduce by 5,2€ million, on average, c.p. On the other hand, regarding 
the E.U. time-series regression (Table 7), Provisions are also not significant at the 10% 
confidence level (p-value is 0,7). Regardless, one could deduce that if Provisions in one of the 
5 banks sample increases by one million €, Financial Instability would increase by 16,76€ 
million, on average, c.p. Nevertheless, Provisions in these two models are far from being 
considered significant and, thus, the reliability of this data is unclear.  
Consequently, while there is the small possibility that the coefficients/estimated impact do not 
represent the true effect when performing a regression, one can infer that if Provisions have 
indeed an impact on the economy and specifically, on the financial stability of the same, it will 
contribute to its increase. Among the three different regressions, in two cases (Panel Data and 
U.K. TS), there is a negative coefficient for Provisions, meaning that an increase of those is 
expected to bring a decrease of the upwards and downwards movements of the GDP, and 
therefore, a decrease in the instability of the same. Additionally, and focusing essentially on the 
Panel Data regression, the results lead us to believe that provisions have a direct and positive 
impact on economic stability. 
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To conclude, it is important to emphasize one major assumption. The purpose and objective of 
this model is to study the marginal effect that Provisions have on the economic stability. That 
said, the model does not suggest an optimal level of provisions. Truly, there is a point until 
which provisions stop being appreciated for countries and companies that desire stability, since 
one of the most important characteristic of economic growth is the circulation of money. In an 
extreme scenario, if banks are constantly putting aside high amount of provisions, loan issuance 
will be significantly reduced. Subsequently, the capital generated will be limited, and therefore, 
rather than obtaining stability, one will reach the opposite objective – constant negative growth.  
5. Aggregate Results (RQ5) 
As concluded before, when answering RQ4, we can extrapolate our results to answer the final 
research question of this paper and ultimate hypothesis: The new accounting framework, IFRS 
9, will contribute to the financial stability of the economy. Undeniably, one thing that was 
concluded during our literature and theoretical review was that the implementation of the new 
impairment model will not only distribute provisions over time, but also increase the level of 
the same during expansions (independently of the risk associated to loans, banks will have to 
underwrite those with provisions, whereas before, it was only necessary in periods where 
default kicks in). Empirically was observed that provisions have a positive impact on financial 
stability. Following a logical reasoning, since the level of provisions will increase under IFRS 
9, the new accounting model will also contribute to the stability of the GDP. Nevertheless, the 
question that still remains is regarding the amount in which it will contribute. However, since 
the new accounting framework was only implemented in 2018, the data available to quantify 
the results is still limited. Being said, one of the main outputs of this paper is a suggestion to 
further research on quantifying the effect of Provisions. 
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6. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The IFRS 9 is an accounting framework required to be implemented by several companies that 
have to comply with the International Financial Reporting Standard and will primarily affect 
banks and insurance companies. The purpose of this work project was to infer about the effects 
that this new accounting framework, IFRS 9, will have on the economy and on the various 
stakeholders and specifically, verify if whether or not it could contribute to higher financial 
stability. Therefore, this research pretends to add to the existing literature some insight, not only 
about the process of the new accounting framework, but also the identification, interpretation 
and possibly quantification of the expected effects brought by the ECL model. This was 
achieved using historical values and extrapolating those to the future. Indeed, previous literature 
about this feature focuses only on the theoretical implications rather than the practical ones, 
which can be explained by the lack of longevity (IFRS 9 was only implemented in 2018). 
Therefore, over this work project, the main objective was to test different hypothesis discussed 
in the literature and answering the different research questions.  
The findings suggest that there is an expected positive contribution by the IFRS 9 to the stability 
of the economy. As seen in section 3, loan loss allowances have a direct influence on capital 
ratios calculations. For banks in particular, it affects their lending criteria, meaning that they 
lend relatively more in times of depression and less in times of expansion, contributing to the 
economy pro-cyclicality. However, after the implementation of IFRS 9, when the economic 
conditions are most promising, banks will be required to allocate allowances (i.e. loan loss 
provisions), which will lead to a decrease of the earnings accounted and reduce loan growth. 
On the other hand, in a recession, formerly accrued loan losses materialise and the hit in capital 
requirements is lower. That said, with the purpose of meeting the minimum regulatory capital, 
it will not be vital for banks to have a substantial cut in lending. Consequently, and since banks 
are a key stakeholder in the economy (as one of the main suppliers of capital and contributors 
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to economy recovery), it will reduce economic volatility through different macroeconomic 
conditions. In section 4, using an empirical approach, it was inferred that provisions can 
contribute to the financial stability of the economy by reducing the upward and downward 
movements of the GDP, although the impact is limited.  
Regarding limitations of the paper, we focus more on the availability of data as it would be 
crucial to present data that would already reflect the effects of IFRS 9. Nevertheless, the 
objective is to focus more on future expectations rather than on analysing current results. 
Secondly, it could also be supportive to have a bigger sample of countries in order to have more 
reliable results. Lastly, managerial discretion and smoothing hypothesis were not considered 
over this work-project and can alter the results obtained, as the level of provisions required 
under IFRS 9 are still significantly associated to professional judgement. 
To conclude, we present three interesting ideas for future research that can be developed. 
Firstly, complete the same type of analysis performed in this paper but include years that could 
already represent the effects of the new accounting framework, i.e. after 2018. Secondly, and 
as previously discussed, although it was empirically observed that provisions results in higher 
economy stability, it is clear that there is an optimal point to which Provisions (as a percentage 
of assets) is desirable. Therefore, it is suggested a research that could reveal this optimal level, 
in form of an equation or interval percentage. Lastly, a forecast of the main changes that the 
new accounting framework will bring in terms of presentation and disclosure for the different 
financial statements (Balance Sheets, P&L, etc…). 
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8. Appendix: 
Exhibit 1 – Capital Requirements Composition under Basel lll 
 
Exhibit 2 – Summary of existing studies on the transitional effect of IFRS 9 on provisions and capital 
ratios 
 
 
Exhibit 3 – Upwards and Downwards Swings of the Economic Cycle 
 
     P a g e  32 | 35 
 
Exhibit 4 – Procedures of differences between the ECL Provision under IFRS 9 and the Regulatory 
one
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 5 – Standard Panel Data Regression
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Exhibit 6 – Autocorrelation and Homokedasticity Test Panel Data 
 
 
Exhibit 7 - Homokedasticity Test U.K. Time-Series 
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Exhibit 8 - Autocorrelation Test U.K. Time-Series 
 
 
 
 
 
Exhibit 9 - Homokedasticity Test E.U. Time-Series 
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Exhibit 10 – Autocorrelation Test E.U. Time-Series 
 
